Strategies in a stochastic game are δ > 0 perfect if the induced one-stage games have certain δ equilibrium properties. Sufficient conditions are proven for the existence of δ perfect strategies for all δ > 0 implying the existence of equilibria for every > 0. Using this approach we prove the existence of equilibria for every > 0 for a special class of quitting games. The important technique of the proof belongs to algebraic topology and reveals that more general proofs for the existence of equilibria in stochastic games must involve the topological structure of how the equilibria of one-stage games are related to changes in the payoffs.
Introduction
A stochastic game is played on a state space. The present state and the present behavior of all players determines stochastically the transition to a new state. All players have complete knowledge of the past history of play and the present state. A priori there is no bound on the number of stages of play.
We define a stochastic game to be normal if (1) there are countably many states, (2) there are finitely many players and at any state the action sets for all players are finite, (3) the payoffs defined in the game are uniformly bounded, (4) the payoffs are functions on the histories of play that are measurable with respect to the Borel σ-algebra defined by the finite stages of the game. This fourth property will be made more precise later.
For any ≥ 0, an equilibrium in a game is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no player can gain in payoff by more than by choosing a different strategy, given that all the other players do not change their strategies. An equilibrium is a 0 equilibrium. We say that approximate equilibria exist if for every > 0 there exists an equilibrium.
It is not known whether all normal stochastic games have approximate equilibria. This question is arguably the most important open question of game theory today. Advantageous for approximate equilibria in stochastic games is the common knowledge by the players of the past history of play and the present options and their consequences. The only uncertainty concerns what the other players will do in the present and in the future. If the stochastic game has finitely many stages then equilibria exist, a consequence of the original Nash proof (Nash [9] ). Disadvantageous for approximate equilibria are the infinite number of stages of play.
A stochastic game is a limit average game when for every player n the payoff is between lim i→∞ inf and lim i→∞ sup of the average where m is the number of players and for every state s ∈ S w n s is a real function defined on the collections (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m ) of actions, once for each player, at the state s.
So far, most positive results of profound generality have concerned two-player limit average stochastic games. Mertens and Neyman [7] proved that every zero-sum limit average and normal stochastic game played on a finite state space has approximate equilibria. Maitra and Sudderth [5] extended this result to zero-sum stochastic games with countably many states and Martin [6] extended this result further to payoff functions defined on the infinite paths of play that are Borel with respect to the σ algebra generated by the finite stage truncations.
Concerning two-player non-zero-sum limit average and normal stochastic games the central result was accomplished by Vieille [14] ; he proved that all such stochastic game with finitely many states have approximate equilibria. For two-player non-zero-sum normal games with countably many states the question is still open.
One approach to non-zero-sum normal stochastic games is to break down the game into infinitely many one-stage games. Given a strategy for each player and any given present state and past history of play, one can look at the one-stage game that starts with this present state and ends with reaching the state on the following stage. One assumes that the players will act according to the given strategies on all the future stages but on the present stage they are free to choose and the payoff consequences for their choices of actions at the present state are determined accordingly. As was shown in Simon [10] , the existence of approximate equilibrium implies a property known as perfection, which concerns equilibrium conditions for the one stage games.
This break down of a stochastic game to its one-stage games also breaks down the problem of the existence of approximate equilibria to two separate questions: a) does some perfection property hold, and b) can this perfection property imply the existence of approximate equilibria? In many situations the perfection property allows one to construct approximate equilibrium through statistical testing and punishment in response to statistical deviation. We establish some conditions (Theorems 1 and 2) for which perfection implies the existence of approximate equilibria.
The general model for normal non-zero-sum stochastic games is given in the second section. Basic results showing that some forms of perfection properties will imply the existence of approximate equilibria is the subject of the third section. This approach was inspired by the Vieille proof [14] , which uses a special case of Theorem 2.
In the fourth section we investigate a special class of stochastic games called quitting games. Examples of quitting games were studied first by Flesch, Thuijsman, and Vrieze [2] but defined in generality by Solan and Vieille [13] . For quitting games the perfection property does imply the existence of approximate equilibria, and we prove this below.
In the fifth section we define a class of quitting games called escape games. Using algebraic topology we prove that all escape games have the perfection property, hence have approximate equilibria.
In the Conclusion, we discuss the broader question of whether all normal stochastic games have approximate equilibria.
The Model

Normal Stochastic Games
For every finite or countable set A let ∆(A) stand for the set of all probability distributions on A. If A is finite then ∆(A) is a finite dimensional simplex. If x ∈ ∆(A) and a ∈ A then the a coordinate of x will be represented as x(a) (the probability given to a by x).
There is a countable or finite state space S and a finite set N of players. For every player n ∈ N and every s ∈ S there is a finite set A n s of actions. For every s ∈ S and every a ∈ A s := n∈N A n s (a choice of action for each player) there will be a transition law p s a ∈ ∆(S) governing the motion to states at the next stage of play after a visit to s.
We assume that the game starts at an initial stateŝ ∈ S. (If one prefers to start with a distribution on all the states in S one can add an initial statê s that occurs only at the start of the game and such that every player has only one action at this state.) Define 
If h ∈ H ω is also in H s then we say that h terminates at s. The i stage truncation of either an infinite history in H ∞ or of a finite history in H j for j ≥ i is the canonical projection to H i .
A payoff for a player n ∈ N in a normal stochastic game is a function V n on H ∞ that is uniformly bounded and measurable with respect to the Borel σ-algebra generated by the partitions of H ∞ induced by the discrete partitions of H i . A two-player game is zero-sum if V 1 (h) + V 2 (h) = 0 for all h ∈ H ∞ (where without loss of generality we assume that N = {1, 2}). Let M ≥ 1 be a positive real number larger than the maximal difference between all payoffs in the game.
Strategies and Equilibria
A strategy σ n of Player n ∈ N is a collection of functions (σ n s | s ∈ S) such that for every s ∈ S σ n s is a function from H s to ∆(A n s ). For every profile σ = (σ n | n ∈ N ) of strategies, one strategy for each player, probability distributions µ σ,i are induced on the H i in the natural way. We start at the initial history (ŝ) ∈ Hŝ 0 with µ σ,0 ({(ŝ)}) = 1. Given that µ σ,i (h i ) is positive for some h i ∈ H s i i and h i+1 ∈ H i+1 is a history such that the i stage truncation of h i+1 is equal to h i ∈ H
(h i )(a n i ). A regular Borel probability distribution µ σ is induced on H ∞ in the natural way, by the µ σ,i and Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem. For every player n ∈ N and every strategy profile σ the distribution µ σ generates a payoff V n (σ) for player n as the expected value of the function V n on H ∞ , determined by the probability distribution µ σ .
For any profile σ = (σ n | n ∈ N ) of strategies, an alternative profilẽ σ = (σ n | n ∈ N ) and a player k ∈ N define σ|σ k to be the strategy profile such thatσ k is the strategy for player k but if n = k then σ n is the strategy for player n. An equilibrium is a strategy profile σ = (σ n | n ∈ N ) such that for any alternative strategy profile (σ n | n ∈ N ) and every player n ∈ N it holds that V n (σ|σ n ) ≤ + V n (σ). A zero-sum game has the value r ∈ R for a designated first player if for every positive there is an equilibrium whose expected payoff for the first player is within of r.
Perfection
For any profile σ of strategies, a player n ∈ N , and a stage i of play define v n σ : H i → R by v n σ (h i ) equaling the expected value of V n (σ) conditioned on reaching h i on the ith stage, with v n σ (h i ) defined to be any quantity bounded within the payoffs defining the game if the probability of reaching h i is zero. Extend to a definition of v n σ : H ω → R in the natural way. For every player n define χ n : S → R so that χ n (s) is the min-max value for player n at the state s, the upper bound for what player n can obtain from a start at s in response to all strategy choices of the other players. Formally χ n (s) equals inf σ supσn V n s (σ|σ n ) where the payoff function V n s is defined by the game for which s is the initial state. The importance of the function χ n is that it represents the ability of the players to punish player n with predetermined strategies (for example as part of an approximate equilibrium).
For every a n ∈ A n s andâ ∈ k =n A k s let (â, a n ) be the corresponding member of A s = k∈N A k s , withâ k the corresponding action of Player k for all k = n. For any function f : H ω → R, state s ∈ S, finite history h ∈ H s , action a n ∈ A n s and strategy profile σ define w f σ (h)(a n ) to be the expected value of f on the next stage after h, conditioned on the use of a n by Player j and the use of σ k s (h) by all the other players k = j. This means that w
Define w n σ (h)(a n ) to be w v n σ σ (h)(a n ). For any σ and player n the functions w n σ and v n σ have the property that for every h ∈ H ω the value v n σ (h) is equal to the expectation of w n σ (h)(·) taken over all the actions of player n and w n σ (h)(a n ) is equal to the expectation of v n σ on the next stage following h, conditioned on the event that a n was chosen with positive probability. For every player n ∈ N and strategy profile σ, define the jump function j
namely the maximal expected value of χ n on the next stage following s. Extend this definition to j n σ : H ω → R in the natural way. With the definition of χ n extended to a function on H ω so that if h terminates at t then χ n (h) is equal to χ n (t), for all h ∈ H s we have j n ω (h) = max a n ∈A n s w χ n σ (h)(a n ).
Definitions: A strategy profile σ of a stochastic game is perfect if for every player n ∈ N there exists a function r n : H ω → R and a subset B ⊆ H ω such that the probability of reaching H ω \B with the strategies σ does not exceed and for all players n ∈ N and all finite histories h ∈ B,
and for all actions a n chosen with positive probability by σ n at h |w r n σ (h)(a n ) − r n (h)| ≤ . A stochastic game is self-perfect if for all players n the function r n is equal to the function v σ . A stochastic game is perfect if there exists an perfect strategy profile for every positive and self perfect if there is an self-perfect strategy profile for every positive .
The following theorem was proven in Simon [10] : A normal stochastic game with approximate equilibria is also perfect.
3 From Perfection to Approximate Equilibria
The Basic Result
For a normal stochastic game it is easy to define a topology on the infinite histories H ∞ of the game. For each finite stage i there will be only countably many histories in H i . A member of the base of open sets is a set of the form {O h i := {h | the ith stage truncation of h is h i } for any finite history h i ∈ H ω . Given a strategy profile σ the µ σ is a regular Borel probability distribution, meaning that for every Borel measurable subset A ⊆ H ∞ and every > 0 there is a closed subset C of infinite histories contained in A and an open subset O of infinite histories containing A such that the measure of the open set O\C is no more than .
of functions is called viable if for every > 0 and finite history h that terminates at s from a start at the state s there are strategies σ = (σ n | n ∈ N ) by the players such that no player n can receive more than f n (h) + from any choice of an alternative strategyσ n played against the strategies (σ k | k = n) of the other players. If additionally for every player n ∈ N the expected payoff from σ were within of f n (h 0 ) with h 0 = (ŝ) then we would be describing a 2 equilibrium of the game. With only two players viability means exactly that for every state s the function gives to each player at any history terminating at s at least her min-max value for the state s, as both players can hold down the other player simultaneously to their min-max value plus any arbitrary > 0. However with three or more players viability is more complex.
We define a strategy profile σ to be δ-viable if there are viable functions
For every player n, strategy profile σ, and finite history h = (s 0 , a 1 , . . . ,
, where h j is the j stage truncation of h.
Theorem 1: If 0 < ≤ 1 and σ is an self-perfect and -viable strategy profile of a normal stochastic game such that for every player n with probability no more than some history h is reached with W Due to the regularity of µ σ there is an open subset O of H ∞ of measure no more than /(2|N |M ) that contains all infinite histories where some finite truncation is outside of B (defining the perfection property) and where for all n ∈ N the function v n σ does not equal the function V n on H ∞ . We extend this to an open set A of H ∞ of probability no more than (1 + |N |) that contains all infinite histories with finite truncations h where W n σ (h) > for some n ∈ N .
Define the following strategies of the players. If any player n chooses an action that was not given positive probability by σ then on the next following stage all other players hold player n down to an expectation of no more than χ n (s) + for the rest of the game, where s is the state on the following stage. (If two players do this simultaneously then punishment follows according to any predetermined ordering of the players.) If h is the first finite history reached which implies that any infinite extension of h must be in A yet no player had chosen an action given zero probability (well defined by the definition of the topology) then the players perform according to strategies holding down each player n to a future expectation of no more than f n (h) + where the f n are the viable functions with v n σ ≥ f n − . Otherwise the players follow the strategies σ. Letσ stand for this strategy profile . Due to the unlikelihood of reaching the set A we have v
for every player n, (where h 0 ∈ H 0 is the initial history).
Define σ to be the strategy profile where Player n chooses some alternative strategy σ n and the other players stay with their strategies as defined byσ. Define a stop rule t on H ω by t(h) being the first stage where all future infinite histories must belong to the open set A or the next stage following the first stage when player n chooses a strategy given zero probability. Otherwise if neither occurs let t(h) be infinite. For player n define two functionsg
is the first stage implying that A must be reached in the future (but no player had chosen an action given zero probability) or g
is the first stage when player n had chosen an action given zero probability. The function g n defines a sub-martingale with respect to the distribution µ σ . The functiong n is never 4 more than g n . Both functions g n i andg n i converge everywhere to Borel measurable functions g n : H ∞ → R andg n : H ∞ → R, the former because a sub-martingale is defined and the latter because the stop time t is defined using the open set A that covers all points in H ∞ where the limit v n σ doesn't exist or doesn't equal the payoff function V n . Furthermore, the expectation V n (σ) does not exceed the expectation ofg n . As the g n i is a sub-martingale we must conclude that the expectation of g n does not exceed that of v n σ (h 0 ), and that concludes the proof.
2.
Question 1: Does Theorem 1 hold if viability is dropped?
The difficulty of Question 1 lies with determining whom is to be punished. Given that A is an open subset of infinite histories covering all of the finite histories which should trigger punishment, the relevant question is "who is responsible for steering the game toward the set A" (and therefore should be punished)? Without the viability of the strategies, Player n may want to steer the game toward A in such a way that often player k is held responsible for entering the set A, although player k was adhering faithfully to her part of the proscribed strategy profile σ. If the stochastic game is structured in a sufficiently simple way, viability may be unnecessary. As we will see below, the viability property can be dropped for quitting games.
Discrete Decision Processes
Let X be a countable or finite set. For every x ∈ X let Y x be a countable or finite set, with Y := ∪ x∈X Y x . For every x ∈ S there is a transition law p x ∈ ∆(Y x ) and for every y ∈ Y x there is a transition law p y ∈ ∆(X). The process starts at some fixedx ∈ X and on the even stages i = 0, 2, 4, . . . the process is in X and on the odd stages the process is in Y . There is a function v : X ∪ Y → R such that for every y ∈ Y x v(y) is the expectation of v(x) on the next stage following y and v(x) is the expectation of v(y) on the next stage following x. We assume that v is uniformly bounded, with M ≥ 1 a bound on the greatest difference between any two values of v.
A Markov chain with a function as described in the above paragraph is called a discrete decision process.
The interpretation of a discrete decision process is as follows. There is an agent choosing the actions in Y x . The agent receives as a payoff the lim-sup of the function v on the path of states in X. Given that the agent chooses elements in Y according to the time independent Markovian strategy defined by the p x at any state the function v will represent the agent's future expected payoff (since by the uniform bound for v and the Martingale Convergence Theorem there will be convergence almost everywhere). We presume that the agent will follow the given strategy, but we will image what could happen if the agent chose to follow a different strategy.
The connection to stochastic games is direct. Let j be a player in a normal stochastic game. Given any strategy profile σ a discrete decision process for Player j is defined by extending the state space so that X = H ω . Define Y h to be only those actions in A j s (h terminating at s) chosen with positive probability. Because every state in the new expanded state space is encountered at most once, time indendendent Markovian strategies are well defined, in addition to a function v derived from the v j σ on the set X = H ω of finite histories and from the w j σ (h) on the actions in Y h . Also a discrete decision process for Player j may be defined by any partition of the finite histories that is equal to or finer than the partition
for all h, h in the same partition member. When this occurs the discrete decision process for Player j is generated by the stochastic game and the strategy profile σ. We get the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1:
If for a normal stochastic game there were a strategy profile σ that is self-perfect, -viable, and for every player j a discrete decision process is generated such that the probability that there is an l with
For any given path p = (x 0 , y 1 , x 2 , y 3 , . . .) of a discrete decision process define w(p) to be i=0,2,..
Notice that discrete decision processes and the functions w involve no loss of generality from Markov chains and the total variation of a martingale function defined on them. Given a Markov chain, we could define Y x so that there is a bijection between Y x and the states that follow x with positive probability, and then for every y ∈ Y x define the distribution p y to be the appropriate Dirac mass.
Definition: A discrete decision process is is balanced if for all states x ∈ X and y ∈ Y x it follows that |v(y) − v(x)| ≤ .
Proposition 1:
Assume that a discrete decision process is δ balanced, that the expectation of w(p) does not exceed a finite B > 0 and δ is less than or equal to 2 ρ/B for some positive ρ > 0. Then the probability that there exists an l with
The Doob sub-martingale inequality states that if (S i | i = 0, 1, . . . , n) is a martingale with zero expectation then for every n ≥ 0, positive value c > 0 and exponent p ≥ 1 the probability that max [15] , Section 14.6). Since the martingale property implies that E(S 2 n ) is equal to the sum over all the stages 1 ≤ i ≤ n of the E(s 2 i ) where s i = S i − S i−1 is the change in value between the i − 1st stage and the ith stage, we can re-write as Probability max
In the context of a discrete decision process, for every i = 0, 2, . . . define the random variable r i to be v(y i+1 ) − v(x i ), and for every i = 0, 2, . . . let R i be the sum of the r k for the even k ≤ i. The process R i is a martingale with zero expectation and so for every even and non-negative integer Q and even non-negative even integer i less than or equal to Q Probability max
By taking the limit as Q goes to infinity and δ ≤ |r i | we get Probability max
The conclusion follows from the size of δ. 2
For all even i and path p = (x 0 , y 1 , . . .) in a discrete decision process, either infinite or finite going at least to some x i , define
Rank
Given a discrete decision process, for any subset A ⊆ X, x ∈ A and any y ∈ Y x define r A (y) ∈ ∆(A) to be the distribution on A determined by the location of the next visit to A. Formally, consider the process such that x is the initial state, the action y is chosen at the initial stage at x, and at all subsequent stages the actions are chosen according to the given time independent distributions. Let q A y be the probability that this process returns to the set A at some stage after the initial stage and for every z ∈ A let q A,z y be the probability that this return occurs and first at the state z. If q Definitions: A state x ∈ X of a discrete decision process is varied if there exists some y ∈ Y x such that v(y) = v(x). The rank of a discrete decision process is the minimal number n such that the varied states can be partitioned into n subsets A 1 , . . . , A n with the property that for every k = 1, 2, . . . , n and every x ∈ A k there is a distribution r
Proposition 2: If a discrete decision process has rank n then the expectation of w does not exceed 2nM .
Proof: For every subset A = A k and x ∈ A let l x be the probability that the last visit to A occurs at x, let m x be the probability that there is no return to A from a start at x, and let n i (x) be the probability that x is the state on the ith stage. We have l x = i n i (x)m x , x∈A l x ≤ 1, and
Define v x to be the expected value of v conditioned on starting at x and returning to the set A (with v x defined to be anything if this occurs with zero probability). Because the distributions are Markovian and time independence and there is a constant r 
x (y) the contribution to w in the set A = A k does not exceed 2M i x∈A n i (x)m x , which is no more than 2M .
2
The following example shows that the conclusion of Proposition 2 must be dependent on the rank or on some similar concept.
Example 1:
The set X has 2n+1 states, namely x −n , x −n+1 , . . . , x 0 , . . . , x n−1 , x n . Assume that |Y x −n | = |Y xn | = 1 and that the state on the next stage following any visit to x −n is again x −n and the same holds for the state x n . Define v(−n) to be −1 and v(n) to be 1. The process starts at x 0 and for every i strictly between −n and n there are two elements of Y x i , namely L and R. If L is chosen then the process moves to the state x i−1 with certainty and if R is chosen then the process moves to the state x i+1 with certainty. At every state strictly between x −n and x n the actions L and R are both chosen with 1/2 probability. Extend v to a function v : X → [0, 1] that defines a Martingale; it follows that v(x i ) = i n for all −n ≤ i ≤ n. Given any small δ > 0, one can make n large enough so that δ is less than 1 n . However from a start at the position 0 the probability that W i will reach 1 for some i will be exactly 1/2. By Kolmogorov's inequality with probability at least 1/2 the process will avoid −n and n for at least n 2 2 stages, implying that the expectation of w will be at least n 2 .
Chain Reduction
We would like to exploit Proposition 2 in combination with Corollary 1. We look for any way to reduce our discrete decision process to that of fewer states so that the rank could go down but the distribution of max i W i (p) does not change significantly.
A subset B of non-varied states of a discrete decision process is removable if from any visit to a state in B the probability of leaving the set B at some future stage is one.
In some cases the decisions made in a subset A of states can be represented equivalently as decisions made at a single state. This happens if there is some special state s such that the first visit to the subset A ∪ {s} is always at the state s and there is a finite m such that from any state in A before m stages occur, regardless of the choice of actions, the process leaves the set A. The probability distributions on the Y x for all the x ∈ A ∪ {s} can be represented by probability distributions on the set Y s = × z∈A∪{s} Y z (Kuhn [4] ).
However a reduction of such a subset A ∪ {s} to the single state s could present problems for applying Corollary 1 to stochastic games. If a player should be punished for striving to attain a higher payoff, should that player be punished for the actions actually made or for the actions in Y s ? The Y s may define counter-factual behavior, meaning that many different "actions" in Y s may generate the same seen behavior. On the other hand, the variance of the functions W i (p) may be considerably higher with the actions from the original discrete decision process than from such a reduction.
Define two disjoint subsets S and T to be chain reducible if T is removable, for every s ∈ S there is a finite subset A s ⊆ X\T not containing s such that every visit to the set A s ∪{s} starts at s, there is a positive integer m such that from any start in A s before m stages the subset A s is left, and furthermore for every
The new discrete decision process is called a chain reduction of the original discrete decision process.
Lemma 1: If a chain reduction of a discrete decision process is δ > 0 balanced then for every > 0 the probability of sup i W i of the original discrete decision process exceeding + δ is not greater than the probability of the same expression exceeding for the chain reduction.
Proof: Let x 0 , y 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i , y i+1 be any sequence in the original discrete decision process. It can be broken down to (x 0 , . . . , y n 1 −1 ), (x n 1 , y n 1 +1 , . . . y n 2 −1 ), . . . , (x n k , . . . x i , y i+1 ) where the x 0 , x n 1 , . . . , x n k are states in the chain reduction. Given any partial sequence x n l , . . . y n l+1 −1 and y = (y n l +1 , . . . , y n l+1 −1 ) ∈ Y xn l by the probability one properties of the chain reduction j=n l ,...,n l+1 −2 (v(y j+1 )− v(x j )) = v(y)−v(x n l ). Therefore it suffices for any sequence x 0 , y 1 , . . . , x l , y l+1 with x 0 ∈ S and x 1 , . . . , x l ∈ A x 0 that j=0,2,...,l (v(y j+1 ) − v(x j )) ≤ δ. Complete x 0 , . . . , y l+1 to any x 0 , . . . , y l+1 , x l+2 , . . . , x k , y k+1 satisfying x i = n(y i−1 ) for all even l ≤ i ≤ k, y k+1 is completing, and j=l+2,l+4,...,k (v(y j+1 ) − v(x j )) ≥ 0. By the δ balanced property it follows that j=0,2,..
Theorem 2: If for a normal stochastic game there is a number k such that for every 0 < ≤ 1 there is a strategy profile σ that is self-perfect, viable and for every player there is a generated discrete decision process with a chain reduction that is 3 /(3kM ) balanced of rank k then the game has approximate equilibria.
Proof: It follows from Corollary 1, Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 1.
A
(with v(x 0 ) = 0). The discrete decision process can be chain reduced to the three states x 0 , x n , and b with A x 0 = {x 1 , . . . , x n−1 }. The probability of not returning to x 0 from a start at x 0 would be 1 2 n−1 , with half of this probability resulting in a move to a and the other half to a move to x n . The expectation on w in the chain reduction would be 1, as the number of expected visits to x 0 would be 2 n−1 and at each visit to x 0 there would be a probability of Proof: For every x ∈ X define q x to be the probability that starting at x the process will not return to x in the future. The contribution to w at the state x will not exceed q x times the number of expected visits to x. The number of expected visits to x does not exceed 1
Conjecture 1: Without the time homogeneous assumption the expected value of the function w is no more than |X|.
The Markovian property is critical to Conjecture 1; it is easy to find counterexamples if the transitions and the function are dependent on the past history.
The main difficulty with Conjecture 1 lies with the lack of a state identity that transcends the stages. We would be satisfied if the expectation of w does not exceed f (n) for any function f : {1, 2, . . .} → R that is independent of the choice of Markov chain.
4 Quitting Games
The Definition
In a quitting game each player has only two action s, c for continue and q for quit. As soon as one or more of the players at any stage chooses q, the game stops and the players receive their payoffs, which are determined by the subset of players that choose simultaneously the action q. As long as no player has stopped the game, all players receive a payoff of zero.
Let N be the set of players. A strategy profile for the players is a sequence of probability vectors (p i | i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) such that for every stage i p i ∈ [0, 1] N . p j i stands for the probability that Player j will stop the game (with the action q) at stage i conditioned on the event that stage i is reached. With 0 standing for the origin, 0 ∈ [0, 1] N means that all players choose the action c with certainty.
The payoffs are defined as follows. For every non-empty subset A ⊆ N of players there is a payoff vector v(A) ∈ R N . At the first stage that any player chooses the action q and A is the non-empty subset of players that choose q at this stage, the players receive the payoff v(A). This means that Player i receives v(A) i ∈ R. If nobody chooses the action q throughout all stages of play, then all players receive 0.
A quitting game is a normal stochastic game. Letx be the state at the start and at any stage such that at all previous stages all players had chosen c. We could define 2 |N |−1 additional states corresponding to the non-empty subsets of N such that once any of these states is reached then no matter what the players do the game remains at this state forever and the players receive the corresponding payoffs. Equivalently we could choose |N | + 1 affinely independent vectors in R N whose convex hull contains all the payoffs defined in the game -then a subset A of players quitting at the same time causes an appropriate probability distribution on the |N | + 1 states. Let M ≥ 1 be an upper bound on the difference between all payoffs.
Correspondences and Orbits
By a correspondence F : X →→ Y we mean any subset F of X × Y . If X 0 is a subset of X then F ∩ (X 0 × Y ) is called the restriction of F to X 0 and denoted by F |X 0 . For every x ∈ X define F (x) := {y | (x, y) ∈ F }. It is not assumed a priori that F (x) = ∅ for all or any particular x ∈ X. The domain of a correspondence F is the subset {x | F (x) = ∅} and the image of F is the subset {y | y ∈ F (x) for some x ∈ X}.
If F : X →→ X is a correspondence then an infinite orbit of the correspondence F is an infinite sequence (x 0 , x 1 , . . .) of points of X such that for every non-negative integer n ≥ 0 we have (x n , x n+1 ) ∈ F . A finite orbit is a finite sequence (x 0 , . . . , x l ) with (x n , x n+1 ) ∈ F for all 0 ≤ n < l. An extended orbit of F is a sequence (s j | 0 ≤ j < L) of sequences s j = (x j,i | 0 ≤ i < n j ), possibly with L = ∞ or n j = ∞ for some or all j < L, such that for every i + 1 < n j x j,i+1 ∈ F (x j,i ) and if n j = ∞ then lim k→∞ x j,k = x j+1,0 and otherwise x j,n j −1 = x j+1,0 . The extended orbit has bounded total variation if j<L 1≤i<n j ||x j,i − x j,i−1 || < ∞, and otherwise it has unbounded total variation.
For every r ∈ R N let Γ r be the one stage game where Player j ∈ N receives the payoff r j if all players choose the action c.
For every r ∈ R N and p ∈ [0, 1] N , let a j (p) be the expected payoff for Player j if she chooses q simultaneously with the strategies (p k |k = j) and let b j (p, r) be the expected payoff for Player j from the action c in the game Γ r , given that the other players choose the strategies (p k |k = j), meaning that she will receive the payoff r j if everyone chooses the action c. One can calculate a j (p) and b j (p, r) easily. We have
Every strategy profile p = (p i | i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) defines payoff vectors r i (p) ∈ R N for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . . such that r j i is the expected payoff for player j from the strategy profile (p i , p i+1 , . . .), equivalent to the payoff conditioned on all players choosing c before the stage i given that no player chooses q with certainty before this stage.
Define a function
The function q is the probability that at least one player chooses the action q.
We will consider the correspondences generated by moving backward from some stage i + 1 to stage i through an approximate equilibrium of the one stage game. For any ≥ 0 we define correspondences
For every r ∈ R N and p ∈ [0, 1] N define a new member of R N , namely
the expected payoffs in the game Γ r when the players choose p. We define F by F (r) := {f (r, p) | p ∈ E (r)}.
Normal Players, Instant and Stationary Equilibria
Definitions: A vector r ∈ R N is feasible if it is in the convex combination of {v(A) | ∅ = A ⊆ N } ∪ {0}. For every player n ∈ N define χ j to be χ j (x) wherex is the initial state. A vector r ∈ R N is -rational for any positive if r n ≥ χ n − for all n ∈ N . A player n ∈ N is normal if v({n}) n ≥ χ n . The vector v ∈ R N is defined by v i := v({i}) i for every player i.
Lemma 3:
If j is an abnormal player then v j < 0 and v({i}) j ≥ χ j for every i = j.
Proof: Consider what happens when every other player chooses c with certainty at every stage. Player j could respond by choosing q at any stage. v j < χ j implies that responding by never choosing q must be at least as good as χ j , meaning that v j < χ j ≤ 0.
Let δ > 0 be given, and consider what happens when Player i chooses q with a probability of δ at every stage of play (and all other players choose c with certainty). By quitting at any stage Player j would receive no more than v j + δM , and for small enough δ this would be worse than χ j . It follows that choosing c at all stages would be the much better choice for Player j,
Lemma 4: Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p k be a sequence of one-stage strategies in [0, 1]
(1 − q(p i )) < 1 is the probability that some player chooses q on some stage and let s 0 , . . . , s k be a sequence of vectors in R N such that
Proof: Define r ∈ R N to be the payoffs to the players conditioned on the event that some player chose q from the strategies p k , . . . , p 1 (starting with p k ). We have assumed that s k = (1 − ρ)s 0 + ρr. With ||s 0 − s k || < δ and ρ(r − s 0 ) = s k − s 0 we have ||r − s 0 || ≤ δ/ρ. With r nk (p) = r for all multiples nk of k and by the definition of the function f (r, p) we have ||r i (p) − s nk−i || ≤ δ/ρ for all (n − 1)k < i ≤ nk. The last claim follows from |b n (r, p) − b n (s, p)| ≤ ||r − s|| for all vectors r, s ∈ R N and players n ∈ N .
Definitions: A quitting game has stationary approximate equilibria if for every > 0 there is a p ∈ [0, 1] N such that (p, p, p, . . .) is an equilibrium. A quitting game has instant approximate equilibria if for every > 0 there is a p ∈ [0, 1] N with p j = 1 for some player j ∈ N and such that a 2 equilibrium is described by the behavior p on the first stage followed by punishment of Player j on the second stage (given that she didn't quit) yielding to Player j no more than χ j + .
Lemma 5: If a quitting game does not have stationary approximate equilibria or instant approximate equilibria then 1) v j > 0 for some normal player and for every normal player j there is another normal player k such that v({j}) k < v k , 2) there is an ρ > 0 small enough so that if r ∈ R N is a ρ-rational vector within a distance of 1 of a feasible vector, p ∈ E ρ (r) and y = f (r) then a) ρq(p) ≤ ||x − y|| and b) q(p) ≤ 1 − ρ.
Proof: 1) If the first claim didn't hold for some player, normal or abnormal, then all players choosing c on all stages would be an equilibrium; and by Lemma 3 this player must be normal. Furthermore, if there were not such a second player k, normal or abnormal, then with > 0 fixed player j choosing q at every stage with probability small enough would describe an equilibrium; and by Lemma 3 this player must be normal.
2) Let ((r i , s i , p i ) | i = 1, 2, . . .) be a sequence such that all the r i are within a distance of 1 of a feasible vector and p i is a member of E 1/i (r i ) with . For some player n the quantity p n is at least 1 − /(3M ). Definep to be the the strategy profile such thatp j = p j if j = n and otherwisep n = 1. It follows thatp along with punishment of Player n for not quitting does describe an equilibrium. 2
Equivalences
Proposition 3 and Theorem 3 are generalizations of some results of Solan and Vieille [13] . We must determine whom to punish and when. Defineî to be min n∈N (i * n , i n ). Ifî is equal to i n for some n ∈ N , then definen ∈ N to be any n ∈ N witĥ i = i n . Otherwise ifî is less than i n for all n ∈ N then definen to be any n ∈ N such thatî is equal to i * n . Before the stageî the players perform according to p. If the game reaches stageî then playern will be punished such that the expected future payoff for this player is no more than χn + /10.
Because the decision to choose q terminates the game immediately, and the one stage advantage by doing so never exceeds 4 /(2M 3 ), the only deviant strategy we need to consider is the repetitive decision to choose c by a player. Due toî ≤ i * n and that the vectors are rational, there is no advantage beyond 2 for Playern to choose c repetitively. Likewise fromî ≤ i * m for all players m ∈ N we need only consider the advantage to a player m =n from the punishment of playern at stageî. It suffices to show that even if Player m never chooses q the stageî (for punishingn) is reached with a probability of no more than /M . Case 1;î < i n andî = i * n : We will look at the discrete decision process for Playern generated by the stochastic game and the given profile of strategies. Let s i be the state representing the history where the ith stage is reached and so far every player has chosen c at every stage up until i. Notice that from s i the distribution on the next visit to {s 0 , s 1 , . . .} is the same for both actions, namely total weight given to the state s i+1 , (for the action q this holds because there is a zero probability of returning to the set). Therefore for playern the generated discrete decision process has rank 1. By Propositions 1 and 2 the probability does not exceed 2 /(M 2 ) that the stageî is reached. As c m i ≥ /M if Player m never quits the probability of reachingî is still no more than /M . Case 2;î = i n : Whether or not Player m or any other player other than n refuses to choose q the probability of Playern not choosing q before stage î does not exceed /M .
2
Theorem 3: For a quitting game without stationary approximate equilibria or instant approximate equilibria the following are equivalent: (i) the game has approximate equilibria,
(ii) for every > 0 there is a cyclic strategy profile p = (p 0 , . . . , p k−1 , p k = p 0 , . . .) with r i (p) ∈ F (r i+1 (p)) for all i = 0, 1, . . ., all the r i are -rational, and q(p i ) is positive for some 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1, (iii) for every > 0 and every B > 1 there is a finite orbit of F of -rational vectors within a distance of 1 of the feasible vectors with a total variation of at least B, (iv) for every > 0 there is an infinite orbit of F of -rational vectors with unbounded total variation, (v) for every > 0 there is an infinite extended orbit of F of -rational vectors with unbounded total variation.
Proof: (ii) implies (i) is the content of Proposition 3. (ii) implies (iii), (iv) and (v) is trivial and (iv) implies (v) is also trivial.
(iv) implies (iii): As the orbit has unbounded variation, any cluster point of the orbit must be feasible.
(iii) implies (ii): Let > 0 be fixed. By the fact that the feasible and /5 rational vectors form a compact set there will be a B be large enough so that any finite sequence of F /5 of total variation at least B will have two vectors s i and s j with i < j in the sequence separated by a total variation of at least 2M such that ||s i − s j || < /5. As they are also separated by strategies p j , p j−1 , . . . , p i+1 giving a probability of at least 1/2 that q was chosen, Lemma 4 suffices for (ii).
(i) implies (iii): Assume that there does exist a positive δ and a bound B > 0 such that every orbit of F δ of vectors that are feasible and δ rational has a total variation less than B. Without loss of generality we assume that δ is less than the ρ given by Lemma 5. By Lemma 5 this case can be reformulated: there exists a positive θ > 0 such that any orbit of F δ of vectors that are feasible and δ rational is created from a strategy profile where the probability that all players choose c on all stages is at least θ. Also by Lemma 5 there is a 0 < d ≤ 1 such that v j ≥ d for some normal player j. Assume that p = (p 0 , p 1 , . . .) is a δθρd/(5M ) equilibrium. As some player can obtain at least d by quitting alone, we must assume that the probability according to p of no player ever quitting is no more than δθρ/(4M ). This means that there must be a stage i where the probability of no player ever quitting before reaching i is between θρ/3 and θ/3. Since we have a δθρd/(5M ) equilibrium the steps from stage 0 to stage i generate a finite orbit of F δ of δ-rational and feasible vectors, a contradiction.
(v) implies (ii): We assume the existence of an extended orbit ((x l,j | 0 ≤ l < Q), j < n l ) of F /3 with unbounded total variation in {x | ∀j
This implies (iii), and we have proven already that (iii) implies (ii).
The argument is essentially the same as (iii) implies (ii). Let x be any cluster point of the sequence (x 0,0 , x 1,0 , . . .). Let x m,0 and x n,0 be any two points in this sequence such that both are within /5 of x and m<l<n i<n l (1 − q(p l,i )) < 30M . We can assume without loss of generality that for every l the total variation in the lth orbit is T l > 0. For every m ≤ i ≤ n − 1 define k i large enough so that the total variation from x i,k i to x i+1.0 does not exceed ρ 2 −i T i . Lemma 4 implies that (ii) holds with the cyclic strategy profile obtained from reversing the probabilities to p n−1,k n−1 −1 , . . . , p n−1,0 , p n−2,k n−2 −1 , . . . , p 1,0 , p 0,k 0 −1 , . . . , p 0,0 , and then repeating. 2
Lemma 6: Assume that all players are normal, that there are neither stationary nor instant approximate equilibria, and s ∈ F 2 /(2M ) (r). If r n ≥ χ n − 3 then s n ≥ χ n − 3 and if r n < χ n − 3 then s n ≥ r n + 2 /(2M ).
Proof: For the sake of contradiction assume the contrapositive. In either case it must hold that s n < χ n − 3 + 2 /(2M ), meaning also that b n (p, r) and a n (p) are less than χ n − 3 + 2 /M . As Player n can get at least χ n from quitting alone we must also assume that the total probability that other players are quitting according to p must exceed 2 /M . But then by Lemma 4 the strategies (p k | k = n) would be a way to hold the payoff of Player n down to χ n − , something impossible. 2
Corollary 2: If all players are normal and there are neither instant approximate equilibria nor stationary approximate equilibria then the game has approximate equilibria if and only if there is an orbit r 0 , r 1 , . . . of F δ of unbounded total variation.
5 Escape Games
The Definition
Define the set
A quitting game is an escape game if 1) every player is normal (
and there is a closed subset Q of R N and a positive > 0 with the following existence and closure properties: 2) Q ∩ ∂W = ∅ and for every x ∈ Q ∩ ∂W there is a y with y j > v j for all j ∈ N such that the closed line segment from x to y is in the set Q, 3) if x ∈ Q\W then any payoff vector y ∈ R N in F 0 (x) with y = x satisfies y j > v j + for all j ∈ N , 4) if x ∈ Q and y ∈ F (x) then y ∈ Q.
The name "escape" reflects the assumption that once one has left the set {x | x j ≤ v j + for some j} with the correspondence F |Q then one has also "escaped" this set for good.
The Spanning Property
We use a property for correspondences called the "spanning" property, defined in Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk [12] . The homology used in that article is the Cech homology with coefficients in a non-trivial compact Abelian group. This approach was chosen because the Cech homology is defined using approximations (Eilenberg and Steenrod [1] ) and hence many properties are preserved when passing to limits. Because the approximation arguments of this article are made explicit, we could use instead the more conventional homology groups defined by continuous maps from simplicies to the topological spaces (and with integer coefficients).
An n dimensional compact manifold with boundary is a topological space such that every point is contained in a subset of the space topologically equivalent to the n dimensional disk D n with this point in the center or on the boundary of this disk.
If C is an n-dimensional compact manifold with boundary in R n then by [∂C] we denote the generator element of the reduced homology group H n−1 (∂C) according to any orientation. (The reduced homology group differs from the non-reduced only in dimension 0.) For example, [∂C] could be generated by any subdivision of C into parts topologically equivalent to D n with the boundary map applied to functions from the n dimensional simplex to these parts of the subdivision. Let U be a non-empty open bounded subset of E. A compact (correspondence) F ⊆ R n × Y is said to have the spanning property for U if there exists a z in the reduced homology groupH n−1 (F |∂U ) such that the images of z inH n−1 (∂U ) andH n−1 (F ) are [∂U ] and 0, respectively, where the first map is that induced by the canonical projection of F |∂U to ∂U and the second map is that induced by the inclusion of F |∂U in the set F (and A stands for the topological closure of A). If the compact correspondence F ⊆ R n ×Y has the spanning property for a non-empty open set U then we say that is has the spanning property for the closure of U . If F has the spanning property for an open set U then F (x) = ∅ for every point x in U (proven in Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk [11] ). This property is the origin for the term "spanning".
We demonstrate some of the power of the spanning property. In a usual proof of Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem, if a continuous function g : D n → D n didn't have a fixed point then there would be a continuous function f : D n → S n−1 such that f (x) = x for all x ∈ S n−1 , and from looking at the induced homology groups we see that this is not possible. The spanning property goes further: for any continuous function from D n to D n such that for all x ∈ S n−1 it holds that f (x) = x the image of f must cover all of D n . Indeed, one can go further. Let f : D n → R n ×R n be any continuous function such that f (x) = (x, x) for all x ∈ S n−1 . F := image (f ) is contractible, and hence has zero reduced homology groups for all dimensions. Considering either the first or second copy of S n−1 to be the domain of the correspondence F , the embedding of S n−1 into S n−1 × S n−1 yields an appropriate element of the n − 1 reduced homology group of the correspondence over S n−1 , implying the spanning property for D n . The spanning property applied to either D n in the first or second position in R n × R n implies that both the image of F and the domain of F must contain D
n .
An important aspect of the spanning property is that it is preserved by restrictions of the correspondence to subsets. Lemma 2 of Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk [12] states that if F is spanning for an open A and D is any open subset of A then F |D is also spanning for D.
Lemma 7: If a correspondence F has the spanning property for an open and bounded set U ⊆ R n and C is a connected and compact subset of U then for every pair x, y ∈ C there is some z 1 ∈ F (x) and some z 2 ∈ F (y) such that (x, z 1 ) and (y, z 2 ) are in the same connected component of F |C.
Proof: Let U i be a decreasing sequence of open, bounded and connected subsets of U converging to C, meaning that C = ∩ ∞ i=1 U i . Since the U i are connected by Lemma 2 of Simon, Spiez and Torunczyk [12] there are connected and compact subsets Z i of F such that the correspondence Z i is spanning for U i . Due to Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk [11] for every i there are pairs (x, a i ) and (y, b i ) in Z i . Because the U i is a decreasing sequence of sets, again due to Lemma 2 of Simon, Spiez, and Torunczyk ( [12] ) we can assume without loss of generality that the Z i is also a decreasing sequence of sets. Define Z to be the intersection of the Z i . Because the Z i are connected and compact, Z is also connected and compact. By its compactness Z contains a pair (x, a) and (y, b) for some a and b as limits, respectively, of some subsequences of the a i and b i . 2 
The Structure Theorem
There is a strong connection between quitting games and another area of game theory usually not associated with stochastic games -structure theorems used to establish stability properties of one-shot games. We remind the readers of the main theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens, [3] . Let N be a finite player set, (A j | j ∈ N ) the finite sets of actions for the players, X the space of all |A 1 |×. . .×|A |N | | matrices with vector payoff entries from R N . For any x ∈ X let G x be the one stage game defined by the matrix x. LetÃ be j∈N ∆(A j ), the strategy space, (where ∆(A j ) is the simplex of probability distributions on A j ). Let E ⊆ X ×Ã be the correspondence defined by E(x) := {y ∈Ã | y is an equilibrium of the game G x }. Let π : X ×Ã → X be the canonical projection. The structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens states that there is a straight line homotopy H(·, ·) from X × [0, 1] to X ×Ã such that π • H(x, 0) = x for all x ∈ X, the image of H(·, 1) is exactly the correspondence E, and the function H can be extended continuously to the one-point compactification of X (meaning that for every compact set C ⊆ X there is an R > 0 large enough that if the norm ||x|| exceeds R then for all t ∈ [0, 1] the point H(x, t) does not lie over C). Here we have slightly modified the statement of the structure theorem, using the fact thatÃ is convex.
Finitely Repeated Quitting Games
For every k ≥ 0 and vector x ∈ R N let Γ k x be the k stage game such that at the conclusion of k stages the players receive the payoff x given that all players chose c on all stages. A strategy in Γ
k representing the probabilities that the players would quit on the various stages. Let
Lemma 8: Let a quitting game be fixed. If k ≥ 1 and x and y belong to a connected and compact subset D of R N such that no equilibrium on the set D involves some player quitting with certainty then there is a pair
and (x, p y ) belong to the same connected component of E k |D, the equilibrium correspondence lying over D.
Proof: We represent the k repeated quitting game Γ k r as a game with the original set N of players and finitely many actions. Let k, the number of stages, be fixed, and let each player n have the finite set A n k = {c, q 1 , . . . , q k } of actions. The action q j means that the player will choose c on all stages up to stage j and then choose q on stage j. If no player chooses q j for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k then the players will receive the payoff r. Otherwise, let j be the first stage such that some player chooses q j and the payoff to the players will be v(A) where A is the set of players who choose q j .
The actions A n k define games with variable payoff matrices. As above, define X to be the space of all k + 1 × k + 1 × . . . × k + 1 payoff matrices, G x the corresponding game for every x ∈ X,Ã the space of mixed strategies, and E ⊆ X ×Ã the equilibrium correspondence. Let H(·, ·) from X × [0, 1] toÃ be the straight line homotopy (Kohlberg and Mertens [3] ) as described above such that the image of H(·, 1) is the equilibrium correspondence E. Defineî : R n → X so that the (c, c, . . . , c) coordinate ofĩ(r) is equal to r and otherwise the other coordinates ofĩ(r) are independent of the choice of r and correspond to the appropriate v(A) defining the quitting game where A is the set of players choosing q l where l is the smallest number such that no player chose q i for all i < l. LetD be the imageĩ(D). Let R > 0 be large enough so that if ||r|| exceeds R then for all t ∈ [0, 1] the point H(r, t) projected to X does not lie inD. Define a function b R :
. The correspondence h({r | ||r|| ≤ R + 2}) ⊆ X ×Ã has the spanning property for {r | ||r|| ≤ R + 2} (because the projection to X of h on {r | ||r|| = R + 2} is the identity function). By our choice of R this same correspondence h({r | ||r|| ≤ R + 2}) over the setD is the equilibrium correspondence E over the setD. As D is compact and therefore there is a maximal probability ρ < 1 that any player quits in any equilibrium E k over D, E|D is topologically equivalent to E k |D. The rest follows by Lemma 7. 2
Escape Games Have Approximate Equilibria
We fix an escape game that does not have stationary approximate equilibria nor instant approximate equilibria, and let ρ > 0 be a quantity defined by Lemma 5 and let > 0 be strictly smaller than either the > 0 defining the escape game or ρ. All claims that follow refer to this game.
Lemma 9:
There is a quantity B > 0 so large that if x j ≥ B for all j ∈ N then there is only one equilibrium in E k , namely 0, the equilibrium where no player chooses q with positive probability on any stage.
Proof: By induction, it suffices to prove this for E 0 . Since every equilibrium involves a probability of at least ρ that no player chose the action q, it suffices that B is larger than
Define the positive quantity δ to be 10M |N | . Define
Define the correspondenceF j,δ to be
Lemma 10:F δ ⊆ F and if an extended orbit ofF δ starts at a point in {x | x j ≥ χ j − } then it remain in this set. If the extended orbit ofF δ started at a point in Q then it remains in Q, and if it starts in Q\(W ∪ T ) then it remains in Q\(W ∪ T ).
Proof: Assume that x ∈ T with x j ≤ v j + and p ∈F j,δ . By quitting alone Player j gets a payoff of v j and by not quitting a payoff of x j . By not quitting any other player k = j gets a payoff of at least v k − δM and by quitting a payoff no better than v k + δM ≤ v k + /10. This completes the proof of F δ ⊆ F /3 . Staying in the set {x | x j ≥ χ j − } is the result of Lemma 6.
Containment in Q follows by the containment ofF δ in F /3 , the definition of an escape game, and the closure of Q.
We assumed that is smaller than the > 0 defining the escape game properties. Assume that x, y ∈ Q with x ∈ W ∪ T and y ∈F δ (x). Since x is already outside of T we know that y ∈ F 0 (x). By the definition of an escape game either y = x or y j > v j + for all j ∈ N . Since is larger than a convergence to a point in T is not possible.
Define an x ∈ ∂W to be critical if there exists a pair of player j, k in N such that
Lemma 11: From any start at a point in T there is a finite orbit ofF δ staying in T that ends at a critical point. Proof: It suffices to prove the claim for escape games without stationary or instant approximate equilibria, and therefore for an escape game with the assumptions made above. By Theorem 3 and Lemma 11 it suffices to show that starting at any critical point x ∈ Q ∩ ∂W either there is an extended orbit ofF δ in (W ∪ T ) ∩ Q with unbounded total variation or there is an orbit ofF δ , finite or infinite, ending or converging to some member of T ∩ Q with total variation of at least δρ/3.
Given a critical point x ∈ Q ∩ ∂W with x j = v j , x i = v i and v({j}) i < v i let y = f (x, p) with p j = δ and p k = 0 for all k = j. Lemma 10 implies that y is in Q. Case 1; there is an infinite orbit of F 0 starting at y and contained in W ∪ T that does not converge: By the definition of an escape game the orbit is in Q and non-convergence implies unbounded total variation. Case 2; there is an infinite orbit of F 0 starting at y and contained in W ∪ T that does converge: Convergence to a point z in the interior of W is impossible, since a distance of t > 0 from the boundary of W implies that any equilibrium of Γ z involves a probability of quitting of at least t/M , and by Lemma 5 this would also mean a motion of at least ρt/M away from this point. With the assumption that the orbit converges to a point in T , a total variation of at least ρδ is obtained in the motion from x to y. The convergence point is in Q because Q is closed. Case 3; there is no infinite orbit of F 0 starting at y and contained in W ∪ T :
There must be a k such that F k (y) is contained in the complement of W ∪ T , since otherwise by the closure of the correspondence F 0 the existence of a finite orbit of F 0 of length k contained in W ∪ T for every k would imply the existence an infinite orbit of F 0 in W ∪ T , (an easy exercise, also see McGehee [8] ).
Let p = (p 0 , . . . , p k−1 ) be any equilibrium in E k (y). Let B be a positive quantity given by Lemma 9 and let x be a point satisfying x j > v j for all j ∈ N such that the closed line segment between x and x is in Q. Consider three line segments, that from y to x, that from x to x, and that from x to the point z := (B, B, . . . , B); define D to be the union of these three line segments. Define a complete ordering on D in the natural way so that z > x > y. By Lemma 8 (z, 0) and (y, p) must be in same connected component of E k |D (as Lemma 9 implies that 0 is the only member of E k (z)). Letx ∈ D be any point with x <x ≤ x. If (x,p) ∈ E k and withp there is a positive probability that some player chooses q then from the definition of an escape game this probability is at least /M . Furthermore there will be a positive constant c > 0 such that ifx ∈ D satisfies x ≤x ≤ z then the distance fromx to W is at least c, and therefore ifp ∈ E k (x) then the probability that some player chooses q will be at least c/M . Let d =
2M
min{c, }. It suffices to show that there is a finite orbit of F 0 of length k starting atŷ ∈ D with y ≤ŷ ≤ x and ending at someẑ withẑ j = v j + for some j ∈ N . By Lemma 10 all points in this orbit are in Q ∩ (W ∪ T ) and by Lemma 11 there is a return to the set ∂W ∩ Q. A total variation of at least is obtained on the return to T . Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is no finite orbit of F 0 of length k starting at anyŷ ∈ D with y ≤ŷ ≤ x and ending at somê z withẑ 
Conclusion
How could one extend the proof of Theorem 4 to a proof for all quitting games? What would a quitting game counter-example look like (to approximate equilibria) if one existed? Infinite total variation is an analytic property, orbit existence an algebraic property, and it seems to be a coincidence that there was a synthesis for a proof of Theorem 4. On the other hand, any counter-example must fail to be an escape game, which means that over some x outside of W there are equilibria involving a positive probability of quitting. Since for any point x outside of W the set F 0 (x) contains at least x from the equilibrium 0 and generically F 0 (x) has an odd number of points we must presume that for many such x the set F 0 (x) contains at least two points. Any analysis of orbits for a candidate counter-example must involve multiple choices for some of the vectors reached.
Looking beyond quitting games, the situation doesn't look any better for finding a counter-example. Stochastic games are played on infinitely many stages, and therefore in general the game trees branch wildly. Quitting games are designed to prevent rapidly growing ways that a player could respond to the past behavior of the other players. In our opinion, to find a counterexample one would fair a better chance staying with quitting games that are not escape games.
The step from perfection to approximate equilibria is well founded for quitting games, however in general the scope of Theorem 2 is very limited. It seems that a proof for the existence of approximate equilibria in all normal stochastic games must tackle this problem -given an > 0 how can some kind of stage-for-stage δ > 0 equilibria translate to the existence of > 0 equilibrium? Example 1 is highly discouraging, and perhaps an integration of a variation of this example into a game with a multitude of players could be the basis of a counter-example.
